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Over the past few years, right-wing populist parties have been attracting more and more 
supporters across Europe and beyond. For example, in the 2014 European elections, the Front 
National secured a relative majority in France.1 In June 2015 the coalition including the Dansk 
Folkeparti won the Danish national elections; with 21.1 percent of votes, the Dansk Folkeparti 
became the second-largest party in the country, doubling its support from the prior elections.2 
                                                          
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2015 Association for Political and Social 
Philosophy Annual Conference, the RIPPLE Seminar at KU Leuven, the Workshop in Political Theory 
at the University of York, the 2016 Justitia Amplificata Workshop at the Goethe University Frankfurt, 
the Cambridge Workshop in Political Philosophy, and the MANCEPT Seminar in Political Theory at 
the University of Manchester. Valeria Ottonelli organised a workshop on the paper at the University of 
Genoa, and we owe her special thanks for this. We wish to thank the audiences at all these events for 
their stimulating questions and comments, and we are particularly grateful to Giuseppe Ballacci, Enrico 
Biale, Emanuela Ceva, Christian Schemmel, Phil Parvin and Miriam Ronzoni. At the margins of one of 
these events, Lisa Lanzone generously found the time for a useful discussion over the literature on 
right-wing populism from within political science. We are also grateful to Matteo Bonotti, Matthew 
Clayton and Corrado Fumagalli for their written feedback, and we wish to thank two anonymous 
reviewers for The Journal of Political Philosophy for their extremely helpful comments. Finally, Gabriele 
Badano would like to thank the Independent Social Research Foundation for its financial support, while 
Alasia Nuti is grateful to the Centre for Advanced Studies “Justitia Amplificata”, Goethe University 
Frankfurt, for having supported her research while this paper was written. 
1 Charlotte McDonald-Gibson and John Lichfield, ‘Far-Right Parties Flourish across Europe in Snub to 
Austerity’, The Independent, May 24, 2014, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/european-election-results-2014-far-right-parties-
flourish-across-europe-in-snub-to-austerity-9434069.html (last accessed May 5, 2017). 
2 Aisha Gani, ‘Danish Election: PM Concedes Defeat and Resigns’, The Guardian, June 23, 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/jun/18/denmark-general-election-2015-results-live (last 
accessed May 5, 2017). 
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In November 2016, Donald Trump, who conveyed right-wing populist messages during his 
presidential campaign, was elected as the forty-fifth president of the US. 
While this recent rise of right-wing populism (RWP) is an extremely hot topic in political 
science,3 it has received little attention from mainstream political theorists. However, the 
spread of RWP offers a concrete example of a general phenomenon that poses a serious 
challenge to one of the most influential frameworks in analytical political theory: John Rawls’s 
political liberalism. This challenge concerns the role played by the notion of reasonableness in 
political liberalism. 
Political liberalism rests on the acknowledgement that human judgement is burdened by 
factors that make it likely that even well-intentioned, intelligent and well-informed persons 
will disagree about complex matters. At least part of the current disagreement upon religious, 
philosophical or otherwise comprehensive doctrines is due to the so-called burdens of 
judgement, and therefore counts as ‘reasonable pluralism’—that is, pluralism resulting from 
the free exercise of human reason.4 Reasonable pluralism creates a problem for the legitimacy 
of any just liberal society. More relevantly for this paper’s topic, reasonable pluralism 
threatens the very possibility of the stability of liberal societies. According to Rawls, stability 
can only be achieved if it is ‘for the right reasons’—stability grounded in citizens’ principled 
acceptance of institutions.5 However, it seems impossible for citizens holding incompatible 
comprehensive doctrines to have principled reasons for supporting the same political 
framework. 
The solution to these problems is grounded in Rawls’s idea that very diverse 
comprehensive doctrines can still form an overlapping consensus on a certain political 
conception. At the most fundamental level, this agreed-upon conception includes basic 
political ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation and of persons as free and equal 
members of this cooperative system. It also includes principles of justice such as the universal 
                                                          
3 In political science, the debate over RWP is so inflated that scholars started to comment ironically on 
their own choice to contribute further to it. See, e.g., Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian 
Jenkins, ‘Introduction: Mapping the “Right of the Mainstream Right” in Contemporary Europe’, 
Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational, ed. by Andrea Mammone, 
Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 1-14, at p. 1. 
4 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 54–
56. 
5 Ibid., pp. 391–392. 
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provision of basic rights and opportunities, the acknowledgement of their special priority and 
the supply of all-purpose means to make them effective for all citizens.6 This conception forms 
a platform for the public reason of society to emerge. If participating in the overlapping 
consensus, citizens can make political decisions by grounding their arguments on this shared 
platform, without making reference to their idiosyncratic comprehensive commitments. For 
Rawls, they have a duty of civility to advance at least one such argument whenever 
constitutional essentials and issues of basic justice are discussed in the so-called public 
forums, which are closely connected to the formal exercise of political power. Therefore, 
public reason primarily applies to politicians and the judiciary, while common citizens should 
only abide by it when voting and contributing to political campaigns.7 Given the strong liberal 
flavour of the agreed-upon political conception, if enough citizens share it, the stability of 
liberal institutions is guaranteed. 
Crucially, Rawls believes that all—and only—reasonable persons come to participate in 
such an overlapping consensus. Reasonableness must be understood in terms of two features. 
First, reasonable persons are willing to propose and abide by fair terms of cooperation for 
mutual benefit between free and equal persons. Persons are conceived as free and equal 
simply in virtue of having two moral powers—namely, the capacities for a sense of justice and 
a conception of the good—that make them fully cooperating members of society.8 Second, 
they ‘recognise the burdens of judgement and accept their consequences’.9 
Rawls discusses at length the possibility of an overlapping consensus emerging where 
there is none—the possibility of reasonableness progressively creating its own support.10 
However, from within political liberalism, it is also paramount to focus on the case in which 
this progress is reversed because the overlapping consensus stops attracting new participants 
and starts eroding over time. The greater the number of unreasonable persons, the more the 
stability of liberal institutions—a central concern for political liberalism—is threatened.  
The rise of RWP should concern political liberals for at least two reasons. First, it constitutes 
a concrete example of how the number of unreasonable persons can increase in broadly liberal 
                                                          
6 John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, University of Chicago Law Review, 64 (1997), 765–807, 
at p. 774. 
7 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 212–254. 
8 Ibid., pp. 49–50. 
9 Ibid., p. 54. 
10 Ibid., pp. 158–168. 
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societies. Second, it shows how the category of unreasonableness and, relatedly, the task of 
dealing with unreasonable persons are much more complex than has been acknowledged so 
far. Not only do the majority of supporters of RWP display a specific type of 
unreasonableness, but also they hold comprehensive doctrines of a certain kind. The 
combination of their type of unreasonableness with that kind of comprehensive doctrine 
presents very specific challenges and opens distinct avenues for any attempt to react from 
within political liberalism to the threat to stability posed by unreasonable persons.11 
This paper is interested in the majority of supporters of RWP as a real-world instance of 
persons who display a particular kind of unreasonableness and also see the connections 
among the components of their comprehensive doctrines in a specific way. Our first aim is to 
argue that political liberals should prioritise the problem of the spread of unreasonableness. 
This is because, as we show in section 1, unreasonableness comes in different variations, 
which, in turn, interact with other categories of Rawls’s political liberalism in interesting yet 
unexplored ways. Our discussion of RWP concentrates only on one such interaction, and 
further work needs to be done to investigate other possible combinations and their normative 
implications. Sections 2 and 3 turn to our second aim, which is to offer a novel strategy from 
within political liberalism to face the rise of RWP—a strategy tailored to the specificities 
displayed by the majority of its supporters. Our strategy centres on a ‘duty of pressure’, which 
applies to citizens in nonpublic forums and includes using certain rhetorical devices to turn 
unreasonable persons towards greater reasonableness. While section 2 provides a justification 
for the introduction of this new duty, section 3 illustrates its main components. Section 4 
discusses the implications of introducing the duty of pressure for political liberalism in 
general. This duty deepens our understanding of the politics of political liberalism by 
incorporating some insights provided by frameworks traditionally at odds with it. Our third 
aim is precisely to show that political liberalism can incorporate those valuable insights while 
staying within its limits.12 
                                                          
11 We return to these two reasons in section 1. 
12 This paper focuses only on Rawlsian political liberalism, and all references to political liberals should 
be interpreted as references to political liberals of a Rawlsian kind. Rawls’s is but one model of so-called 
consensus political liberalism, usually contrasted with convergence models. However, Rawlsian 
political liberalism is extremely influential. Moreover, our argument is that certain categories as 
understood by Rawls are well suited to think about RWP, and that, at the same time, analysing RWP 
helps advance our understanding of those Rawlsian categories. Therefore, the question of whether the 
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1. Right-Wing Populism through Rawlsian Lenses 
Within political science, there is a lively debate over how best to characterise parties like the 
Danish Dansk Folkeparti, the Italian Lega Nord and the Swiss Schweizerische Volkspartei, 
leading different scholars to label them differently (e.g., ‘populist radical right’ and ‘the 
extreme right’).13  
We follow Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell’s influential account, which chooses 
the term ‘right-wing populism’ and defines it as  
 
[a] thin-centred ideology that pits a virtuous and homogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous 
“others” who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their 
values, rights, prosperity, identity and voice.14  
 
‘Thin-centred ideology’ is a term of art that originates in Michael Freeden’s seminal analysis 
of ideology.15 In contrast to thick ideologies like fascism, thin-centred ideologies draw on a 
limited range of political concepts and thus cannot provide a ‘broad, if not comprehensive, 
range of answers to […] political questions’.16 Moreover, this already-limited array of concepts 
lacks internal consistency.17 Similarly, Ruth Wodak and Majid KhosraviNik note that the 
programmes of right-wing populist parties are usually issue-specific because they ‘aim to 
address and mobilize a range of equally contradictory segments of the electorate’.18 For 
                                                          
duty of pressure is compatible with other models of political liberalism falls outside the scope of this 
paper. For an overview of different understandings of political liberalism, see Jonathan Quong, ’Public 
Reason‘, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/public-reason/ (last accessed May 5, 2017). 
13 Piero Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003);  and Cas 
Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 11–
59. 
14 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, Populists in Power (Oxon: Routledge, 2015), p. 5, our 
italics. 
15 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996). 
16 Michael Freeden, ‘Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?’, Political Studies, 46 (1998), 748–765, at p. 750. 
17 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p. 485. See also Paris Aslanidis, ‘Is Populism an Ideology? A 
Refutation and a New Perspective’, Political Studies, 64 (2016), 88–104, at pp. 88–91. 
18 Ruth Wodak and Majid KhosraviKik, ‘Dynamics of Discourse on Politics in Right-Wing Populism in 
Europe and beyond: An Introduction’, Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, ed. by Ruth 
Wodak, Brigitte Mral, and Majid KhosraviKik (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. xvii-xxviii, at p. xvii. 
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example, in countries such as France, many followers of right-wing populist parties 
previously supported communist parties.19 Like fascist parties, communist parties were 
arguably centred on a thick ideology that, however, strikingly fell at the other end of the 
political spectrum than present-day right-wing populism. 
Translating these observations into Rawlsian categories, the previous paragraph provides 
independent reasons to accept Rawls’s general claim about the prevalence of ‘partially 
comprehensive’ doctrines, at least when applied to RWP supporters. When explaining how 
an overlapping consensus over a liberal conception of justice can emerge, Rawls argues that 
‘many if not most citizens’ endorse political principles ‘without seeing any particular 
connection, one way or the other, between those principles and their other views’.20 Their 
political views are only loosely connected with their beliefs in domains such as morality and 
religion, which contributes to making their doctrines partially, not fully, comprehensive. 
Large numbers of RWP supporters seem to fit this description. They appear to be attracted to 
proposals regarding specific political issues because they find such proposals compelling in 
themselves and not because they see a link between those proposals and their disparate 
comprehensive doctrines. The doctrines held by many supporters of RWP, thus, exemplify a 
feature that, according to Rawls, characterises the worldviews of many members of our 
societies—partial comprehensiveness. 
Another important element of Albertazzi and McDonnell’s definition is the ‘us/others’ 
dichotomy. Generally, populism is characterised by a Manichean logic of a virtuous people 
against a corrupt elite.21 What matters here is that the message conveyed by RWP also sets the 
virtuous people against social groups like Muslims, Roma and Sinti minorities, migrants and 
persons of immigrant descent. If a group is included among these ‘others’, its members are 
systematically singled out qua members of that group and depicted as unable to be and even 
become fully functioning members of society. For example, the political campaigns of the 
Front National centre on the idea that Muslims as Muslims cannot be truly French because 
                                                          
19 Maria E. Lanzone and Gilles Ivaldi, ‘From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Organizational Change and 
Adaptation in the French Front National’, Understanding Populist Party Organization: A Comparative 
Analysis, ed. by Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 
131-158. 
20 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 160. 
21 Among many others, see Yves Mény and Yves Surel, Par Le Peuple, Pour Le Peuple: Le Populism et Les 
Démocraties (Paris: Fayard, 2001), pp. 14–21.  
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they are unable to accept and live by French political values.22 This idea is shared by many 
other European right-wing populist parties—for instance, in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland.23 As another example, the Romani population are the 
targets of depersonalising, if not dehumanising, discrimination by the Italian Lega Nord, 
which has even depicted them as ‘more difficult to eradicate than rats’.24 
Reading these remarks through Rawlsian lenses, those who accept RWP’s message about 
groups like Muslims and Roma effectively accept that members of those groups typically lack 
the sheer capacity to even become fully cooperating members of society. As explained in the 
introduction, this capacity is what makes persons politically equal in the eyes of reasonable 
persons. To say that membership in a group systematically translates into lack of such sheer 
capacity sounds utterly implausible. Therefore, RWP supporters unreasonably deny the bases 
for the status of equal persons to many who should count as equal. This denial is what makes 
supporters of RWP unreasonable in a Rawlsian sense. 
Moreover, this unreasonable attitude translates into policy proposals that are unreasonable 
also because they clash with the equal provision of basic rights and opportunities across 
society, which, as explained in the introduction, all reasonable persons accept. Consider the 
2009 Swiss ban on the construction of minarets, which arguably violates freedom of religion. 
This ban was introduced through the influence of the Schweizerische Volkspartei, and it 
received praise from the leaders of many other European right-wing populist parties.25 As 
Fabio Wolkenstein stresses while discussing the tension between RWP and liberalism at large, 
these sorts of exclusionary allocations of rights and entitlements are inconsistent with liberal 
theories.26  
                                                          
22 Sylvain Crépon, Enquête au Coeur du Nouveau Front National (Paris: Nouveau Monde Éditions, 2012), 
p. 218.  
23 E.g., Hans-George Betz, ‘Mosques, Minarets, Burquas and Other Essential Threats: The Populist 
Right’s Campaign against Islam in Western Europe’, Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and 
Discourse.  
24 Elenonora Martini, ‘Rom, la Paura e l’Odio: Salvini Soffia sul Fuoco’, Il Manifesto, May 29, 2015, 
https://ilmanifesto.it/rom-la-paura-e-lodio-salvini-soffia-sul-fuoco/ (last accessed May 5, 2017). On 
Antiziganism in Lega Nord, see also Nando Sigona, ‘"Gypsies out of Italy!": Social Exclusion and Racial 
Discrimination of Roma and Sinti in Italy’, Italy Today: The Sick Man of Europe, ed. by Andrea Mammone 
and Giuseppe A. Veltri (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 143-157.  
25 Anas Altikriti, ‘Minarets and Europe’s Crisis’, Al Jazeera, December 2, 2009, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/12/200912281637353840.html (last accessed May 5, 2017).  
26 Fabio Wolkenstein, ‘What Can We Hold against Populism?’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 41 (2015), 
111–129, at pp. 113–14. 
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Now, we aim to suggest not only that RWP supporters are unreasonable, but also that they 
generally display a specific kind of unreasonableness, further complicating this Rawlsian 
notion. As Albertazzi and McDonnell observe, RWP followers ‘do not always position 
themselves on the extreme Right (quite the opposite in fact)’.27 More specifically, unlike, say, 
neo-Nazis who proudly embrace racist views and explicitly strive for dismantling liberal 
institutions, many RWP supporters do not regard themselves as enemies of liberalism. They 
often regard themselves as guardians of liberal values against the threat posed by ‘others’ 
whom they (unreasonably) see as inherently unfit for citizenship in a liberal society. Right-
wing populist leaders are well aware of this feature characterising a significant component of 
their electorate, and use it for their advantage. Indeed, the unreasonable message of such 
leaders is often framed as a defence of liberal democratic values.28 For example, Marine Le 
Pen—the leader of the Front National—has repeatedly invoked French liberal tenets (e.g., 
women’s rights and the rejection of homophobia) in her attacks against the Muslim 
population.29  
The case of the majority of RWP supporters suggests that at least two different kinds of 
unreasonableness can be identified: (i) ‘self-aware’ and (ii) ‘unaware’ unreasonableness. The 
difference between them is essentially about self-consciousness. While the self-aware 
unreasonable (e.g., white supremacists) self-confessedly believe that the liberal order should 
be overthrown, the unaware unreasonable (e.g., the majority of RWP supporters) are 
effectively unreasonable but do not conceive of their political views and activities as 
ultimately inimical to liberal democracies and liberal ideas of freedom and equality.30 
Let us take stock. According to Rawls, (reasonable and unreasonable) persons can have 
either fully or partially comprehensive doctrines. By discussing RWP supporters, we have 
shown that unreasonableness admits at least two variations: self-aware or unaware 
unreasonableness. Therefore, there are (at least in theory) four categories of unreasonable 
                                                          
27 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, 'Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre', Twenty-First 
Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, ed. by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan 
McDonnell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 1-11, at p. 4. 
28 Ibid. See also Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, pp. 78–79. 
29 Crépon, Enquête au Coeur du Nouveau Front National, chapter 5; Nonna Mayer, 'From Jean-Marie to 
Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right', Parliamentary Affairs, 66 (2013), 160–178. 
30 We thank an anonymous reviewer for helping us with this clarification. 
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persons resulting from the combination between types of unreasonableness and kinds of 
comprehensive doctrines, as shown in table 1.  
 
Table 1: Combining Types of Unreasonableness with Types of Comprehensive Doctrines 
 Partially comprehensive 
doctrines  
Fully comprehensive 
doctrines 
Unaware 
unreasonableness 
UUPCDs UUFCDs 
Self-aware 
unreasonableness 
SAUPCDs SAUFCDs 
 
 
We have suggested that most RWP supporters are among the unaware unreasonable with 
partially comprehensive doctrines (UUPCDs), which provide the main focus of the following 
sections. To reiterate, the fact that UUPCDs hold partially comprehensive doctrines does not 
make them any more or less unreasonable. In fact, many reasonable persons do likewise. 
However, we must pay attention to this feature. As shown in section 3, political liberalism 
faces specific obstacles when it comes to handling unreasonable persons who, like many RWP 
followers, hold partially comprehensive doctrines. Analogously, it is important to pay 
attention to the unaware nature of the unreasonableness of UUPCDs because, as it will turn 
out, certain avenues for countering the spread of the unreasonable are especially well-suited 
to it. 
Another disclaimer is in order. Our focus on UUPCDs is not meant to suggest that other 
possible combinations of types of unreasonableness and comprehensive doctrines are less 
threatening for stability, or that nothing should be done about them, or even that the strategy 
regarding UUPCDs developed in sections 2 and 3 cannot in part be adapted to their case. The 
other combinations simply fall beyond the scope of this paper, but a future focused analysis 
of each would be greatly beneficial to political liberalism. Our analysis of UUPCDs aims to 
show that the most- and least-fitting strategies for handling the unreasonable in this category 
can only be identified by attending to its specific features, and the same likely holds true of 
the other three combinations we have identified.  
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2. Containment through Engagement 
Despite his faith in progress towards a liberal society grounded in a solid overlapping 
consensus, Rawls admits that the presence of many unreasonable views is a permanent fact 
of any society, including those at the end of that progress. This ‘gives us the practical task of 
containing them—like war and disease—so that they do not overturn political justice’.31 This 
comment can be interpreted as hinting at the case in which progress towards greater 
reasonableness reverses and the number of unreasonable persons moves progressively closer 
to constituting a threat to stability, as with the rise of RWP. However, Rawls never explains 
how to seek containment. 
This section aims to contribute towards filling this gap, especially regarding UUPCDs, by 
justifying a conception of containment centred on citizens’ discursive engagement. This might 
sound surprising, given that the state seems best placed to undertake containment. Moreover, 
in light of Rawls’s comparison with war and disease, one might think that the state should 
conceive of containment as the implementation of tough measures against the unreasonable. 
Jonathan Quong develops a novel account of containment that precisely revolves around 
curtailing the basic rights of the unreasonable. Quong discusses two examples—the right of 
parents to direct the education of their children and the right to disseminate hate speech.32  
Despite its immediate plausibility, and although it has a role to play in the big picture of 
containment, we believe rights infringement cannot be the main strategy for seeking it, 
especially in relation to the unaware unreasonable. As liberals, political liberals recognise that 
the rights of individuals are particularly important. Such importance is reflected in Rawls’s 
claim that reasonable persons not only support providing equal basic liberties to all but give 
special priority to protecting those liberties over other political goals.33 
To be sure, Quong recognises that containment through rights infringement is only 
justified under exceptional circumstances: when there is a ‘real threat’ to stability and, 
                                                          
31 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 64 fn. 19. 
32 Jonathan Quong, ‘The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 12 (2004), 314–
335, at pp. 325–335. 
33 Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, p. 774. For a general discussion of the primacy of liberty 
within liberalism, see Gerald F. Gaus, Shane D. Coutland, and David Schmidtz, ‘Liberalism’, The 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2015 Edition), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/liberalism/ (last accessed May 5, 2017). 
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therefore, to other citizens’ rights. According to him, there is ‘a strong presumption in favour 
of non-interference’.34 On our part, we agree that if, say, there is a fully mobilised 
unreasonable group with the power and intention to overthrow integral parts of the liberal 
constitutional order, Quong’s coercive solutions are permitted. However, such solutions can 
be seen as fully justified only if other less extreme strategies have been implemented 
beforehand and have failed. Indeed, the special value of everyone having equal basic rights is 
not fully honoured if a liberal society sets a high threshold for the curtailment of rights but 
then sits back and waits. That society would be ready to passively witness unreasonable views 
growing increasingly influential, therefore getting progressively closer to the point where 
rights infringement would be required. To fully honour the value of equal rights, their 
infringement cannot be the primary containment strategy of political liberalism. A different 
strategy should be applied earlier on the path to a ‘real threat’ to stability. 
One may object that, even if rights were violated only when stability is under real danger, 
the explicit threat of this infringement would work as deterrent before that point is reached. 
If the state proclaimed that the rights of a specific group might soon be infringed, fear would 
dissuade unreasonable citizens from that group from becoming a real threat to stability. 
Because of this deterrence effect, so the objection goes, rights infringement can be justified 
even if no other strategy has been attempted earlier on. In a sense, the state never passively 
witnessed unreasonable views growing increasingly strong.35  
As others have already pointed out, there are reasons to be sceptical about the deterrence 
effects on unreasonable persons of threats of last-ditch coercive measures.36 These threats are 
likely to exacerbate the problem of instability because they risk making the unreasonable even 
more alienated from and resentful towards liberal institutions. For instance, by drawing on 
Carol Swain’s empirical study on white supremacist groups in the US, Robert Talisse observes 
that the members of these groups started mobilising because they felt rejected by the liberal 
                                                          
34 Quong, ‘The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens’, pp. 328–329. 
35 We thank an anonymous referee for this objection. 
36 See, for example, Corey Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? How Democracies 
Can Protect Expression and Promote Equality (Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 77–
78; Nancy L. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals: The Personal Uses of Pluralism in America (Princeton 
(NJ): Princeton University Press, 2000); Robert B. Talisse, Democracy and Moral Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 42–78. 
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state and mainstream society.37 Threats of having their rights violated would likely lead such 
persons to ‘see themselves as excluded, victimized, and oppressed’ even further.38  
The potential destabilising effects of the threat of rights infringement can be fully 
appreciated when considering the unaware unreasonable, exemplified by many RWP 
supporters. As seen, most RWP followers do not regard themselves as enemies of liberalism. 
However, they do have a sense of grievance against existing liberal institutions, which they 
perceive as too indifferent towards ‘the people’ and complicit with the allegedly dangerous 
‘others’. If these RWP supporters heard from such institutions that their rights might soon be 
violated because of their views, they would likely become even more frustrated, perhaps to 
the point of self-consciously rejecting liberal ideas and explicitly mobilising against the liberal 
project. In order words, they might well turn into self-aware unreasonable persons. 
This increased frustration towards liberal institutions would likely push unaware 
unreasonable citizens to further isolate themselves from mainstream society, by forming or 
joining ‘enclaves’ with others who share their views. As Cass Sunstein famously argues, 
‘When people find themselves in groups of like-minded types, they are especially likely to 
move to extremes’, which, in the case of unreasonable citizens, increases the risk of 
instability.39  
The problems affecting rights infringement show that ‘softer’ strategies should be 
implemented beforehand, whereas rights can only be infringed after such strategies fail. 
Remaining focused on the role of institutions, the state could, for example, carefully choose 
national holidays, build public monuments and craft school curricula so as to celebrate the 
basic values of political liberalism. In his account of how the state should speak to support 
liberal ideas of freedom and equality, Corey Brettschneider lists these metaphorical instances 
of state speech alongside the classic liberal commitment to promulgating the justification 
behind laws and policies.40 Also, one might suggest that the rise of RWP and of other 
unreasonable groups would be more unlikely if the state guaranteed solid economic prospects 
                                                          
37 Talisse, Democracy and Moral Conflict, p. 61. 
38 Ibid., p. 60.  
39 Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 2. 
40 Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?, esp. pp. 42–49. 
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to the population at large or otherwise implemented a strong conception of socioeconomic 
justice.41  
We welcome these sorts of policies. They all seem useful medium- to long-term measures 
of containment that promise to act preventatively by reducing the chances that the progress 
towards greater reasonableness will be reversed at some point in the future. However, it 
seems overoptimistic to say that they would completely eliminate the risk of any such reversal. 
As mentioned above, Rawls voices similar caution when he admits that unreasonable views 
are a volatile fact of life of any society. In well-ordered societies, one would expect those views 
to be too weak to threaten stability, but even under such favourable conditions, ‘that is the 
hope; there can be no guarantee’.42 
Moreover, political liberal theorists can only partially accept the proposal to create strong 
socioeconomic justice. Reasonable pluralism extends to liberal conceptions of justice, and it is 
particularly difficult to find agreement over the principles regulating socioeconomic 
inequalities. Consequently, Rawls admits that his own theory of justice, which includes the 
rather demanding ‘difference principle’, does not by itself exhaust the content of public 
reason. Such content is provided by a whole family of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice 
that only overlap on a weaker sufficientarian principle guaranteeing a social minimum to 
everyone.43 Now, even if we knew that the difference principle or another strong principle of 
socioeconomic justice would considerably help to contain the unreasonable, we could not 
preempt the ‘orderly contest’ that should take place in society between reasonable conceptions 
of justice by imposing a strong commitment to socioeconomic justice on liberal citizens who 
reasonably reject it in favour of weaker principles.44 This would amount to bracketing at the 
level of theory an important aspect of reasonable pluralism, which is a key concern of political 
liberalism. Therefore, although we accept that a social minimum might be important for 
containment, we, as theorists, cannot require any stronger redistributive principle because 
that would preempt the discussion between reasonable conceptions of justice, creating 
significant tensions with political liberalism. 
                                                          
41 For a defence of greater socioeconomic equality as the best way to fight ‘bad civil society associations’, 
see Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein, ‘Bad Civil Society’, Political Theory, 29 (2001), 837–865. 
42 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 65. 
43 Ibid., pp. xlviii-xlix and 226-227. For the observation that regarding justice, the widest differences of 
reasonable opinion are about socioeconomic matters, see ibid., pp. 227–230.  
44 See Ibid., p. 227 for reference to the orderly contest.  
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In sum, the state certainly has a preventative role to play, but it is unable to completely 
eliminate risks. Also, state policies appear ill equipped to react to those cases in which 
unreasonable views have already started to progressively gain consensus in society—
especially if we consider that the provision of socioeconomic benefits, which might seem a 
comparatively suitable reactive measure, can be only partially guaranteed within political 
liberalism. And our argument focuses precisely on these sorts of cases, which are exemplified 
by the trajectory of RWP in many countries.  
The fact that state interventions can only do so much to protect liberal institutions from 
unreasonable views creates the room to justify a ‘duty of pressure’ (DP): a duty to discursively 
engage the unreasonable that befalls citizens. We derive it from the principle of liberal 
legitimacy, analogously to how Rawls derives the duty of civility. The principle of liberal 
legitimacy, which requires that state decisions about the most fundamental political questions 
be settled on the basis of public reasons, is Rawls’s solution to the tension between the coercive 
nature of political power and the idea that such power is ultimately the power of the public.45 
Crucially, the goal of liberal legitimacy is important enough to justify duties to be discharged 
by citizens: ‘since the exercise of political power must be legitimate, the ideal of citizenship 
imposes a moral, not a legal, duty—the duty of civility—to be able to explain to one another 
on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for 
can be supported by the political values of public reason’.46 Immediately afterwards, Rawls 
adds that civility also requires that citizens be willing to listen to others and display fair-
mindedness. 
Given Rawls’s identification of legitimately exercised power with public reason, power to 
the unreasonable would mean illegitimate power. Section 1 explained that the message of 
RWP demotes all members of certain groups to the status of less than equal in society, clashing 
with one of the ideas forming the basis of public reason—namely, the freedom and equality 
of all persons. Therefore, power to parties pushing these sorts of messages would be a huge 
blow to liberal legitimacy. Since state-led policies to contain the unreasonable cannot cover all 
bases, the goal of liberal legitimacy requires the imposition of another duty on citizens in 
addition to civility. As will be explained in section 3, this duty requires that, when certain 
                                                          
45 Ibid., pp. 135-137 and 216-217. 
46 Ibid., p. 217. 
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conditions obtain, citizens should harness the persuasive potential of tailored engagement in 
the attempt to contain the spread of unreasonableness among their acquaintances—
persuasive potential that seems promising in the case of UUPCDs. 
This derivation of DP from Rawls’s principle of liberal legitimacy is only a part of our full 
justification for it. To be fully justified, DP must be shown to be compatible with the main 
tenets of political liberalism. In particular, because they are both duties of citizens, derived in 
parallel to one another from the same principle of liberal legitimacy, it is important to 
demonstrate that the duties of civility and pressure are consistent. After the features of DP 
have been explained in section 3, section 4 returns to this task, showing that not only does DP 
not stand in the way of citizens’ obligations of civility as explicitly defined by Rawls, but it is 
also in line with civility’s animating spirit—namely, the willingness to keep dialogue going in 
order to avoid descending into open conflict. 
 
3. The Duty of Pressure  
To contain UUPCDs, we propose introducing DP. In general terms, DP is a moral duty 
requiring that ordinary reasonable citizens press the unreasonable they know (e.g., relatives, 
friends and colleagues) on their political views to change their mind and push them towards 
greater reasonableness. In this process, reasonable citizens can employ certain forms of 
rhetoric. DP is an imperfect duty, which means that although reasonable citizens are not 
required to fulfil it in every encounter with their unreasonable acquaintances, they are 
certainly morally at fault if they hardly ever engage with them when occasions arise.  
After this general characterisation of DP, we now specify its constitutive components, 
starting with its content and then turning to its holders, forums, triggering conditions and 
nature.  
 
3.1. Content 
The limits of rights infringement and other state-led interventions have led us to introduce 
discursive engagement with the unreasonable. Although Rawlsian political liberals have 
discussed it before, they have generally focused on an avenue for engagement that we intend 
to sideline. Specifically, they have argued that consensus over reasonable political notions can 
be built through conversations starting with deeper and more comprehensive (generally religious 
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or metaphysical) ideas, from which to draw implications for the political realm. Matthew 
Clayton and David Stevens focus on the specific case of the religious unreasonable who reject 
the basic tenets of liberalism based on their interpretation of their faith. They suggest that 
reasonable citizens from the same broad community of faith as the unreasonable should 
convince them that ‘their religious views are mistaken as religious views’,47 and then draw a 
connection between the doctrinally correct views and the acceptance of public reason. Even if 
he discusses more generally how consensus can be built around reasonable conceptions of 
liberal justice, Paul Weithman also imagines conversations occurring within different 
religious or otherwise comprehensive communities. His main example is that of Catholics 
showing to their coreligionists that the principled acceptance of toleration most neatly fits 
with the acceptance of Catholic theological arguments.48 
We wish to move away from Weithman-like strategies in determining the content of DP. 
At least as a general rule, when citizens press UUPCDs on their political views, they should 
keep the discussion as close as possible to the political domain. They should generally avoid 
attacking unreasonable beliefs by showing how complex connections can be built between, on 
the one hand, religious, moral or otherwise comprehensive doctrines and, on the other hand, 
reasonable political ideas. 
The reason we propose this is not that we take civility to forbid appeals to one’s 
comprehensive doctrine during containment. Our introduction reconstructed how narrowly 
Rawls constrains the conditions under which the duty of civility bars citizens from arguing 
for conclusions for which they do not have any public reason. As will be explained in section 
3.2, DP requires engagement with the unreasonable in informal venues that simply fall outside 
the public forums where public reason applies. Rather, reliance on deep religious or otherwise 
comprehensive ideas to build consensus around political notions is simply unsuitable for the 
specific unreasonable persons we are concerned with, those who hold partially comprehensive 
doctrines. Indeed, it may well be that Weithman-like strategies are perfectly fitting for other 
types of unreasonable persons. 
                                                          
47 Matthew Clayton and David Stevens, ‘When God Commands Disobedience: Political Liberalism and 
Unreasonable Religions’, Res Publica, 20 (2014), 65–84, at p. 79. 
48 Paul Weithman, Rawls, Political Liberalism and Reasonable Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016), pp. 70-74. See also Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp. 241-242. 
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As explained in section 1, the majority of the followers of RWP seem attracted to its political 
message without seeing any particular connection between it and the disparate 
comprehensive views they endorse. An argument starting from religious or otherwise 
comprehensive doctrines and then trying to establish a connection with reasonable political 
conclusions would struggle to capture the interest of these unreasonable persons or anyway 
would find it extremely difficult to connect to how they form their political beliefs. 
For example, citizens embracing the message of the Front National might not conceive of 
themselves as enemies of liberalism, but we saw that effectively, their political views are in 
tension with fundamental political liberal ideas like that of all persons as free and equal. A 
reasonable person might want to press a supporter of the Front National by trying to establish 
a close fit between the basic political ideas of political liberalism and deeper commitments 
from a comprehensive platform. However, arguments of this sort fail to connect with the way 
many RWP supporters form their political views. Although focusing on the message 
conveyed by thin-centred ideologies, not the thinking of their adherents, Freeden stresses that 
‘many chains of ideas one would normally expect to find stretching from the general and 
abstract to the concrete and practical […] are simply absent’.49 
In sum, the space for arguments working at the level of deep comprehensive ideas and 
correcting unreasonable political beliefs that do not fit with them is virtually closed. To 
contain UUPCDs, something else should be introduced to fill the space left vacant by such an 
engagement strategy. We propose that this space should be filled by (some forms of) rhetoric.  
Rhetoric is speech that aims to persuade and needs, therefore, to be tailored to a specific 
audience.50 Carving out a role for rhetoric within DP does not necessarily mean accepting 
techniques that might be persuasive but entail an intentional violation of the rules of correct 
reasoning—techniques Rawls seems to reduce the whole of rhetoric to and is rightly sceptical 
about.51 There is a huge space between, on the one hand, arguments that correct a 
demonstrably false factual statement or a mistake in formal reasoning, and, on the other hand, 
speech that intentionally employs fallacies in the form of an argument, such as denial of the 
antecedent, to persuade. This ‘middle space of speech’ includes rhetorical speech that aims to 
                                                          
49 Freeden, ‘Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?’, p. 750. 
50 Bryan Garsten, Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment (Cambridge (MA): Harvard 
University Press, 2006), p. 5. 
51 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 220. 
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effect a change in one’s interlocutors when there is room for it–when, as with the unaware 
unreasonable, there are still several common political assumptions and a partially shared 
political vocabulary that can be used as footholds for persuasion. This is what should be given 
a central role in the fulfilment of DP. 
To be sure, the possibility of outright correction would sometimes be available to the 
reasonable citizens exercising DP. For example, while engaging with the political views of an 
RWP supporter, a reasonable person might be able to falsify key claims by pointing to a factual 
mistake. Also, she might be able to identify counterexamples to a generalisation made by her 
interlocutor. Reasonable citizens should certainly use these arguments, but they should also 
be open to the rich middle space of persuasive speech that we discussed above. Let us now 
give some examples of speech falling in that space. 
We borrow a first set of rhetorical devices from Jane Mansbridge’s famous analysis of 
everyday political talk. Mansbridge describes how ordinary citizens call partners, friends and 
colleagues terms like ‘male chauvinist’ in an attempt to change their beliefs and behaviours. 
These powerful terms indicate a kind of person one’s interlocutors do not want to be and be 
seen as. Mansbridge describes them as shorthand for claims about the injustice of certain ideas 
and behaviours, but a fully explicit description of such claims and, even more so, of their 
justification does not come naturally in everyday exchanges.52 Therefore, in using these terms, 
persons do not violate any formal rule of logic, although they do not fully explicate the 
arguments that justify their use. This is why the appeal to terms like ‘male chauvinist’ squarely 
falls in the middle space of speech. 
Empirically, Mansbridge finds the use of these terms effective in shifting ideas and 
behaviour.53 In engaging with an RWP supporter, a promising charge that reasonable citizens 
can direct at her is that her beliefs about, say, the status of Muslims and Roma minorities in 
society make her a ‘racist’ or a ‘fascist’. In certain European countries, the epithet of ‘fascist’ 
would be particularly closely tailored to certain audiences, providing precious shared ground 
between them and their reasonable interlocutors. In Italy, for instance, the fascist/antifascist 
                                                          
52 Jane Mansbridge, ‘Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System’, Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy 
and Disagreement, ed. by Stephen Macedo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 211-238; and Jane 
Mansbridge and Katherine Flaster, ‘The Cultural Politics of Everyday Discourse: The Case of "Male 
Chauvinist"', Critical Sociology, 33 (2007), 627–660.  
53 Mansbridge, ‘Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System’, p. 219. 
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divide has historically been an important component of many persons’ identities, which is 
often handed down from generation to generation. Imagine an encounter between Francesca, 
an Italian reasonable citizen, and Marco, a supporter of Lega Nord. Francesca knows that, 
perhaps because of his family background, Marco strongly identifies with the antifascist 
camp. Here it would make particular sense for Francesca to insist that Lega Nord’s 
unreasonable views resonate with key tenets of fascism and, therefore, turn its supporters into 
the kind of persons he very emphatically does not want to be. 
A second example of rhetorical devices is reasoning from analogy. As mentioned in section 
1, many right-wing populist parties fight to impose severe limits, if not bans, on the 
construction of Islamic public places of worship. For example, Lega Nord campaigned in 2015 
to stop the construction of new mosques in Milan.54 While continuing her discussion with 
Marco, Francesca could use analogies to reduce the appeal Lega Nord gains by proposing 
these sorts of policies. A parallel could be drawn with a country like Saudi Arabia, where 
Christians are forbidden to publicly practice their religion. Here Francesca could press Marco 
by saying that if he thinks Saudi Arabia should be condemned, he should also decry Lega 
Nord.  
Analogies fall within the middle space of speech because it is extremely hard to 
conclusively establish whether each and every relevant feature obtains to a sufficiently similar 
degree in the compared cases, therefore ensuring that the analogy is perfect. For instance, it is 
difficult to work out, especially during everyday interactions, whether the presence in Milan 
of a few prayer rooms inside Islamic cultural centres, although inadequate to the overall 
Muslim population and certainly not equivalent to a mosque, makes a decisive difference.  
Support to the idea that reasoning from analogy can be persuasive is given by George 
Lakoff’s groundbreaking work in cognitive science, which demonstrates that human thinking 
is to a large extent analogical. According to Lakoff, human beings very often solve a problem 
by thinking of it in terms of another, as with his famous example of two competing models of 
fatherhood steering political debates in the US.55 Reasoning from analogy thus promises to be 
                                                          
54 Sergio Rame, ‘Salvini Dice "No" alla Moschea’, January 10, 2015, 
http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/milano/salvini-dice-no-moschea-ci-sono-milioni-islamici-pronti-
1081552.html (last accessed May 5, 2017). 
55 George Lakoff, Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think, second edition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
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persuasive because it connects with the ways human beings commonly form and revise their 
ideas. 
Appeal to trusted authorities provides a third example of rhetorical strategies. Proponents 
of deliberative rhetoric such as Simone Chambers and Bryan Garsten argue that in complex 
societies, citizens cannot be expected to judge by themselves all aspects of important political 
questions. Thus, citizens often need to rely on the opinions of speakers whom they trust to be 
authorities on the matter at hand. From a deliberative perspective, trust in authorities is not 
problematic insofar as citizens have no reason to believe that such authorities lack integrity or 
are otherwise unreliable.56 
The pope is looked up to by many Catholics when it comes to political values. Therefore, 
he provides a good example of trusted authority that reasonable citizens living in Catholic 
countries can invoke while challenging the political views of RWP supporters. Consider again 
the case of Francesca, who is now pressing Marco on his belief that Muslims cannot possibly 
function as equal citizens. She knows Marco is Catholic. Hence, among other things, Francesca 
could suggest that because Pope Francis stresses the commonalities between Islam and 
Christianity and urges interfaith dialogue, Marco should reconsider his belief in the 
incompatibility between Islam and the fulfilment of one’s obligations of citizenship in a 
country, like Italy, with a Catholic majority.57 
Because of the theoretical nature of this paper, we cannot guarantee that the exercise of DP 
would reverse the spread of RWP. However, there is room for a reasonable hope that it would 
help, because our proposed strategies seem particularly apt to move the majority of RWP 
followers, who display unreasonableness of the unaware type. 
If Marco consciously embraced a fascist ideology, calling him a ‘fascist’ or a ‘racist’ would 
do nothing to shake him, and he would likely be unmoved by analogies with blatant violations 
of liberal rights. However, the unaware unreasonable do not regard themselves as enemies of 
                                                          
56 Simone Chambers, ‘Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy Abandoned Mass 
Democracy?’, Political Theory, 37 (2009), 323–350, at p. 340; and Bryan Garsten, ‘The Rhetoric Revival in 
Political Theory’, Annual Review of Political Science, 14 (2011), 164–174. 
57 Pope Francis expressed his views on Islam in his Evangelii Gaudium and in numerous public 
statements, which were criticised by the leaders of Lega Nord. See Stephanie Kirchgaessner, ‘Rightwing 
Northern League Makes Gains in Italian Elections’, The Guardian, June 1, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/northern-league-gains-italian-elections-matteo-
salvini (last accessed May 5, 2017). 
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liberalism—in fact, they often think of themselves as its guardians. Therefore, they still share 
with reasonable citizens a set of terms, trusted authorities and analogies that reasonable 
citizens can draw on in their attempts at persuasion. Regarding epithets, we have already seen 
how RWP supporters do not generally want to be identified with fascists or other right-wing 
extremists.58 To mention another example, an American reasonable citizen can plausibly try 
to put pressure on her unaware unreasonable friend who supports Trump by comparing 
Trump’s intention to deport all undocumented immigrants with, say, the Trail of Tears in the 
1830s, when the federal government forcibly removed Native American peoples from their 
homeland to an area west of the Mississippi. Such an analogy is apt because both the 
reasonable citizen and her unreasonable friend are still likely to believe that that was an 
outrageous event in American history.  
A final observation is needed to dispel the impression that DP requires unilateral 
communication. DP does not simply entail a duty to talk to unreasonable persons but also 
presupposes a duty to listen to them. Listening to the unreasonable is not simply instrumentally 
important to win their trust and gain the knowledge necessary to persuade them. It is also 
intrinsically valuable because, to avoid manipulation, rhetoric should imply some degree of 
reciprocity. In Anthony Laden’s words, trying to rhetorically move someone should also 
involve ‘a willingness to be moved, and thus an expression of a commitment to find common 
ground together’.59 With RWP supporters, willingness to be moved does not mean openness 
to become unreasonable and, say, agree on the unequal status of Muslim citizens. However, 
it implies a readiness to discover that some of the background concerns of unreasonable 
persons may be worth endorsing. For instance, reasonable citizens should be open to 
recognising that, in contrast to what they might have previously thought, some followers of 
RWP convincingly highlight how current growing economic inequalities and high rates of 
unemployment within liberal democracies are unjust, and governments should do more to 
address them. Consequently, reasonable citizens should be ready to consider whether to 
revise their own political views, although remaining within the range of reasonable 
conceptions of justice. 
                                                          
58 Albertazzi and McDonnell, ‘Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre’, pp. 3–4. 
59 Anthony Simon Laden, 'Constructivism as Rhetoric', A Companion to Rawls, ed. by Jon Mandle and 
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3.2. Duty Holders and Forums 
Given the central function assigned to rhetoric, it should be citizens at large who discharge DP. 
As mentioned, for rhetoric to be effective, attempts at persuasion should be based on 
distinctive knowledge of one’s interlocutors. Therefore, assigning DP to every reasonable 
citizen is necessary to ensure there will be duty holders with the right sort of knowledge about 
enough individuals supporting RWP. 
Placing DP on citizens at large has the additional advantage of involving as many 
reasonable persons as possible from the network of each supporter of RWP. If DP is fulfilled, 
the unreasonable are likely to be confronted in different occasions over time by different 
reasonable acquaintances. They might well reexamine their unreasonable political views 
precisely because not one, but a few dear persons have criticised them. Also, different 
reasonable acquaintances of an RWP supporter are likely to challenge her beliefs from 
different angles, maximising the chances that the right buttons will be pushed and her views 
will be shifted towards greater reasonableness. In other words, the thought is not that Marco 
will embrace reasonableness simply as a result of a single encounter with Francesca. A shift 
in Marco’s political ideas seems more likely after multiple encounters with different 
reasonable persons. 
Following from our discussion of duty holders, DP should be discharged in what Rawls 
would call ‘nonpublic’ forums, where citizens have the opportunity to come across RWP 
supporters with whom they have some connection and, therefore, about whom they have the 
personal knowledge that boosts persuasion. These forums include physical meeting places 
like pubs, family get-togethers and workplace gatherings. Also, they include virtual spaces 
like Facebook, where a citizen can see comments supporting right-wing populist ideas that 
her friends have posted on their pages. In virtual and physical forums alike, DP requires that 
citizens be ready to react to these sorts of comments when voiced by persons they know, press 
these persons on such comments, and try to shift their views towards greater reasonableness. 
Nonpublic forums are particularly fitting also because they are places where reasonable 
citizens can spot early signs of their friends’ transition into unaware unreasonableness and, 
thus, put pressure on them at a stage when pressure promises to be most effective. 
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3.3. Triggering Conditions and the Nature of DP 
Which conditions trigger DP? This question links back to section 2, where we discussed 
Quong’s idea that containment through rights infringement should start when the 
unreasonable pose a real threat to stability. That discussion suggests that DP should apply 
under a broader range of circumstances. However, such circumstances cannot be too broad 
because DP creates a new burden for citizens, and it seems unjustified to impose it when no 
service would be done to stability. Like Quong, we only have the space to provide a vague 
specification of the conditions triggering DP, to be understood primarily as the general 
direction that should be followed in future analyses. In this paper, we limit ourselves to 
suggesting that DP applies when signs arise that a process has started that risks leading society 
towards the real threat to the stability of liberal institutions mentioned by Quong. Examples 
of these signs might include the number of RWP supporters stably growing over a few years, 
and such parties becoming so accepted as respectable political players that they are asked to 
join coalition governments. 
Finally, we discuss the nature of DP. DP must be understood as a moral, not a legal, duty 
in that the state must not enforce it by law. As with public reason, the main justification for 
the moral nature of DP is that its legal enforcement would violate freedom of expression.60 DP 
should be interpreted as an imperfect duty in that DP admits exceptions that are to some 
extent for the duty holders to work out.61 It seems excessive to require that once the triggering 
conditions obtain, reasonable citizens must react to each and every relevant unreasonable 
comment, at whatever personal or professional cost. That said, this discretion is not 
unconstrained. Surely, a reasonable citizen is morally at fault if she hardly ever engages with 
the RWP followers she knows. Also, it seems plausible that the more advanced the process 
that risks resulting in a real threat to stability, the less often citizens should make exceptions 
for themselves—and therefore the more often they must discharge DP. However, here we 
cannot provide a fully fledged account of the constraints imposed on the discretion enjoyed 
by duty holders. 
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4. Politicising Political Liberalism (but Not Too Much) 
It is now time to consider the wider implications that DP has for political liberalism. Realist, 
agonist and radical-democratic theorists criticise political liberalism for its impoverished 
understanding of politics. These critics point out that political life extends well beyond what 
political liberals call ‘public forums’: politics must be practiced in places like ‘the streets, 
squares, church basements, and theatres of civil society’, and even at home.62 Moreover, 
politics is inexorably conflictual, and citizens are therefore expected to actively fight for their 
values.63 This contrasts starkly with the idea of public reason, which Rawls describes as 
specifying the political relation between citizens ‘at the deepest level’. 64 Public reason requires 
that citizens passively refrain from grounding fundamental political decisions solely in 
controversial comprehensive doctrines. Applying these critiques to RWP and building in 
particular on a previous analysis by Chantal Mouffe, Fabio Wolkenstein argues that political 
liberalism cannot do anything to face it. According to Wolkenstein, political liberalism is 
inherently ‘antipolitical’ because it fails to recognise that persons always start forming their 
political views and engaging politically out of their particular interests and identities, not the 
universalistic ideals of public reason.65  
By (i) extending political life into discussions with friends, colleagues and relatives and (ii) 
asking citizens to actively promote their values, DP takes on board some of the insights into 
politics offered by the critics of political liberalism. Moreover, DP recognises that a great many 
persons hold exclusionary views, and it engages with them where they are, in the hope of 
progressively pushing them closer to reasonableness. Consequently, if political liberalism 
incorporates DP, it also appears to offer a reply to Wolkenstein’s specific concern.  
Given that DP makes political liberalism a less naïve interlocutor for its critics, political 
liberals should welcome it. However, they might also worry that by introducing DP, we 
effectively move beyond political liberalism. This is a legitimate concern because realists, 
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agonists and radical democrats build upon their rich account of politics to challenge the very 
tenability of political liberalism and, in particular, of public reason, which is the key to Rawls’s 
solution to the problems of legitimacy and stability. We now prove the compatibility between 
DP and political liberalism by showing that DP is still consistent with (i) Rawlsian public 
reason, (ii) civility more in general, (iii) the kind of respect citizens owe to each other, and (iv) 
the typically liberal unwillingness to demand too much from citizens. The discussion of the 
compatibility of DP and political liberalism will also complete the justification of DP, which 
section 2 could only develop up to a point.  
Unlike agonist, realist and radical-democratic critiques of political liberalism, DP leaves 
public reason unscathed in all its traditional forums. To repeat, Rawls believes that public 
reason, which essentially regulates the exercise of the state’s coercive power, only constrains 
common citizens when they vote or participate in electoral campaigns. ‘Its limits do not apply 
to our personal deliberations and reflections about political questions, or to the reasoning 
about them by members of associations’—in other words, to the ‘background culture’ of 
society.66 Therefore, DP is not a substitute for, and does not interfere with, the duty of civility 
to provide public reasons in public forums. We simply argue that, under certain circumstances 
and in forums other than those of public reason, citizens should also discharge a brand-new 
duty regulating their interactions. 
The duty to honour public reason is the dimension of civility that Rawls focuses on the 
most, but he also mentions two others. According to him, being civil also means displaying ‘a 
willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in deciding when accommodations to 
their views should reasonably be made’.67 DP satisfies these requirements, which seem meant 
to apply also beyond public reason’s forums, therefore demonstrating that it does not involve 
uncivil pressure on any dimension of Rawlsian civility. As explained in section 3.1, DP 
involves both a duty to listen and an openness to be persuaded by other citizens’ political 
views while remaining within the range of reasonable political conceptions.  
Even moving beyond civility as explicitly discussed by Rawls, and turning to the spirit 
animating Rawls’s account, there is room to argue that such spirit is similar to the one 
characterising DP. Rawls’s account is discussed as a typical example of a specific kind of 
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civility. Michael Meyer calls it ‘liberal’ civility and describes it as applying to ‘conditions of 
severe disagreement’, where its primary goal is to avoid the worst outcome-‘especially but 
not only the (violent) end of civil dialogue’.68 Similarly, Cheshire Calhoun depicts Rawls-like 
‘political’ civility as striving to ensure that ‘dialogue among those who disagree will continue 
rather than break down’.69 
The goal of preventing a terrible political outcome (instability) by keeping dialogue going 
also characterises DP in its focus on UUPCDs, who still share some discursive ground with 
reasonable citizens. Moreover, DP is characterised by the rejection of violence in discourse. 
We surely do not propose ‘intimidation, harassment and coercion’, classed by Calhoun as 
uncivil, as part of DP, and we have even excluded the manipulative use of logical fallacies.70 
In sum, DP, which section 2 introduced as distinct from civility and justified in parallel with 
it, is compatible with both the letter and the spirit of Rawls’s account of civility. 
Next, one might argue that DP is inconsistent with political liberalism because it is 
disrespectful towards the unreasonable. Some commentators suggest that Rawls’s scepticism 
towards rhetoric is grounded on the idea that rhetoric violates the respect owed to persons.71 
According to them, Rawls endorses a critique of rhetoric that can be traced back to Immanuel 
Kant. As explained by Garsten, the Kantian worry is that if influenced by rhetoric, persons fall 
under the sway of someone else, rather than being guided by their own reason. In other words, 
rhetoric ‘moves us, instead of convincing us to move ourselves’.72  
Although this critique is sound when directed against manipulative rhetoric, it forgets that 
other forms of rhetoric incorporate respect for persons. As Garsten argues, persuasion ‘is 
worthwhile because it requires us to pay attention to our fellow citizens and to display a 
certain respect for their points of view and their judgments. The effort to persuade requires 
us to engage with others wherever they stand and to begin our argument there’.73 Persuasion 
                                                          
68 Michael Meyer, ‘Liberal Civility and the Civility of Etiquette: Public Ideals and Personal Lives’, Social 
Theory and Practice, 26 (2000), 69-84, at p. 76. 
69 Cheshire Calhoun, ‘The Virtue of Civility’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29 (2000), 251-275, at p. 269. 
70 Ibid., p. 256. 
71 For example, see John O’Neill, ‘The Rhetoric of Deliberation: Some Problems in Kantian Theories of 
Deliberative Democracy’, Res Publica, 8 (2002), 249–268, at pp. 253–254.  
72 Garsten, ‘The Rhetoric Revival in Political Theory’, p. 167. 
73 Garsten, Saving Persuasion, p. 3. 
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is respectful in that it ‘acknowledge[s] the particular features of individuals’74—that is, their 
concrete situations and distinctive ways of thinking. 
Everyday political talk, analogies, and appeals to trusted authorities—rhetorical strategies 
we endorsed in section 3.1—are respectful precisely in this sense. By appealing to the 
allegiances, identities and personal histories of RWP supporters, with special but not exclusive 
attention to the common discursive ground with reasonable interlocutors, they start from 
what these individuals—in their singularity—value as important factors in forming their 
political views. In other words, this type of persuasive speech starts from what many RWP 
supporters actually rely on to guide themselves when it comes to political issues. Moreover, 
DP is respectful because, as seen in section 3.1, it outright rejects other forms of rhetoric that 
intentionally violate the rules of correct reasoning. This exclusion was grounded in the fact 
that although fallacious rhetorical techniques might be persuasive, they would manipulate 
weaknesses in the reasoning of unreasonable individuals, thereby falling short of respecting 
their autonomy. Finally, DP is respectful towards unreasonable persons because it 
presupposes a duty to listen to them and to be open to be moved by some of their concerns, 
thereby prescribing a reciprocal engagement. 
Finally, DP might be regarded as too demanding for the conception of citizenship that 
political liberalism endorses as a liberal doctrine. Compared to traditions like civic 
republicanism, liberalism has been generally reluctant to heavily burden citizens qua citizens 
in ‘nonpublic’ life spheres, especially in terms of political participation and activism. With its 
emphasis on engagement, DP might seem to sit uncomfortably with such liberal (and thus 
political liberal) wariness. Recall, however, that DP is a moral duty, which means citizens can 
never be coerced into complying with it. Moreover, DP is only triggered when there are signs 
that a process has started that risks leading society towards a threat to stability. The very 
existence of triggering conditions means scenarios exist where citizens are completely free 
from any expectation to exert any pressure on the unreasonable. Finally, DP is an imperfect 
duty. Even when the triggering conditions obtain, citizens can exercise discretion over how 
often they discharge DP. Also, this discretion is greater the less advanced the process that is 
likely to lead to a threat to stability. 
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These features demonstrate that DP incorporates a typically liberal concern with 
overdemandingness in those spheres that liberals tend to conceive as nonpublic. Also, 
whenever DP effectively turns out to be rather demanding, it is only for the sake of the sheer 
survival of liberal institutions. Obviously, liberals should deeply care about this goal, 
reducing the tension with political liberalism even further. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Section 4 demonstrated that DP stays within the limits of political liberalism, which should be 
taken as excellent news by political liberals. This paper has shown that DP seems fitting for 
the task of reacting to the spread of UUPCDs, a threat to key values such as legitimacy and 
stability. Therefore, it is important that political liberals can accept DP while remaining loyal 
to the basic commitments of their framework. 
Crucially, we have only been able to establish the fittingness of DP for the containment of 
UUPCDs, exemplified by the majority of the supporters of RWP,  because we have highlighted 
that unreasonableness is more complex than generally acknowledged and interacts in 
unexplored ways with other Rawlsian notions, such as the distinction between partially and 
fully comprehensive doctrines. Further research is in order, to map the full variety of 
unreasonable persons and to identify the most fitting containment strategies for those who 
differ from the type explored in this paper. 
